Fordham Law Review
Volume 88

Issue 6

Article 16

2020

To “Otherwise Make Unavailable”: Tenant Screening Companies’
Liability Under the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Theory
Shivangi Bhatia
Fordham University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Housing Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Shivangi Bhatia, To “Otherwise Make Unavailable”: Tenant Screening Companies’ Liability Under the Fair
Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Theory, 88 Fordham L. Rev. 2551 ().
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol88/iss6/16

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

NOTES
TO “OTHERWISE MAKE UNAVAILABLE”:
TENANT SCREENING COMPANIES’ LIABILITY
UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT’S DISPARATE
IMPACT THEORY
Shivangi Bhatia*
Tenant screening companies present information to housing providers on
prospective tenants’ criminal and eviction histories in the form of
background screening reports. These screening reports disproportionately
impact racial and gender minorities. Two opposing views exist on whether
courts should interpret the Fair Housing Act to cover the discriminatory
practices and policies of tenant screening companies. Some believe that
background screening reports are a vital part of the housing industry, while
others criticize them for their inaccurate, misleading, and discriminatory
nature. This Note proposes that, moving forward, courts should interpret
§ 3604(a) and § 3604(b) of the Fair Housing Act to allow for tenant
screening liability. Looking to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in NAACP v.
American Family Mutual Insurance Co., a broad interpretation of the Fair
Housing Act that combats the disparate impact of background screening
reports is in line with judicial precedent, the Act’s legislative history, and the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s administrative
guidance.
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INTRODUCTION
“Poor black men are locked up while poor black women are locked out.”1
In 2017, African Americans and Hispanics accounted for 28 percent of the
U.S. adult population but represented an overwhelming 56 percent of the

1. MATTHEW DESMOND, MACARTHUR FOUND., POOR BLACK WOMEN ARE EVICTED AT
ALARMING RATES, SETTING OFF A CHAIN OF HARDSHIP 3 (2014), https://
www.macfound.org/media/files/HHM_Research_Brief_-_Poor_Black_Women_Are_
Evicted_at_Alarming_Rates.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5CV-QZ2J].
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prison population.2 In 2016, 2.3 million evictions were filed in the United
States, at a rate of four per minute.3
Incarceration and eviction have a tragic effect on the lives of people of
color. Landlords regularly displace tenants in this demographic who have
prior criminal or eviction records from their homes or blacklist them from
future available housing units.4 Housing providers often hire tenant
screening companies to provide background reports on these prospective
tenants.5 Screening companies utilize public databases to collect information
on a tenant’s credit score, criminal history, and eviction records, among other
information.6 When creating these background reports, screening companies
may provide the landlord with a recommendation or score.7 A landlord
typically relies on this guidance when determining whether to deny housing
to a prospective tenant.8
Congress passed the Fair Housing Act9 (FHA) to eliminate housing
discrimination across America.10 Congress intended the Act to be construed
broadly11 and did not specify which actors could be held liable for housing
discrimination under the Act.12 Courts and the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) have taken the lead in defining the Act’s
boundaries. Federal courts have interpreted § 3604 of the FHA, a provision
that establishes liability for actors who “make unavailable or deny” a

2. John Gramlich, The Gap Between the Number of Blacks and Whites in Prison Is
Shrinking, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/
04/30/shrinking-gap-between-number-of-blacks-and-whites-in-prison/
[https://perma.cc/
B8SM-G32M].
3. Terry Gross, First-Ever Evictions Database Shows: ‘We’re in the Middle of a
Housing Crisis,’ NPR (Apr. 12, 2018, 1:07 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/12/601783346/
first-ever-evictions-database-shows-were-in-the-middle-of-a-housing-crisis
[https://perma.cc/W7FB-7QQV].
4. Merf Ehman, Fair Housing Disparate Impact Claims Based on the Use of Criminal
and Eviction Records in Tenant Screening Policies 2–5 (Sept. 2015) (unpublished
manuscript), https://www.nhlp.org/wp-content/uploads/Merf-Ehman-FH-DI-Claims-Basedon-Use-of-Criminal-and-Eviction-Records-Sept.-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/NP38-HN4S].
5. Id. at 2.
6. Id. at 3–5.
7. Id. at 2.
8. See Colin Lecher, Automated Background Checks Are Deciding Who’s Fit for a
Home: But Advocates Say Algorithms Can’t Capture the Complexity of Criminal Records,
VERGE (Feb. 1, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/1/18205174/automationbackground-check-criminal-records-corelogic [https://perma.cc/RH63-T5C7].
9. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2018) (“It is the policy of the United States to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.”); see also Tex. Dep’t
of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2521 (2015).
11. Ehman, supra note 4, at 7–8; see also Mich. Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin,
18 F.3d 337, 344 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Congress intended § 3604 to reach a broad range of
activities that have the effect of denying housing opportunities to a member of a protected
class.”).
12. See NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 298 (7th Cir. 1992) (“By
writing its statute in the passive voice—banning an outcome while not saying who the actor
is, or how such actors bring about the forbidden consequence—Congress created ambiguity.”).
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dwelling to a protected class,13 broadly to cover more than just housing
providers. Since the late 1900s, federal courts, like the D.C. Circuit and Sixth
Circuit, have held that the FHA’s ambit extends beyond housing providers to
insurance companies.14 Most prominently, in NAACP v. American Family
Mutual Insurance Co.,15 Judge Frank H. Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit
concluded that when insurers redline16 areas inhabited by a large number of
racial minorities, they raise the cost of housing and “make [dwellings]
unavailable” under § 3604(a) and face liability under § 3604(b) because they
provide a “service” “in connection” with the sale or rental of a dwelling.17
This Note explores the opposing views on whether tenant screening
companies should be liable under § 3604 of the FHA. It highlights two major
federal district court decisions that have spoken on intermediary liability:
Frederick v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A.18 and Connecticut Fair Housing
Center v. CoreLogic Rental Property Solutions, LLC.19 Frederick supports
a narrow reading of § 3604 where tenant screening companies would not be
liable,20 while CoreLogic promotes a broad construction where they would
be.21 This divide is representative of a larger set of interpretive questions
that the FHA has and will continue to confront,22 with courts divided on

13. “To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate
for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
“To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of
a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” Id. § 3604(b).
14. See generally Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351 (6th Cir. 1995);
United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Metro. Human Relations Comm’n, 24 F.3d 1008 (7th
Cir. 1994); Burrell v. State Farm & Cas. Co., 226 F. Supp. 2d 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Nat’l Fair
Hous. All. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2002).
15. 978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992).
16. Redlining constitutes insurers charging higher rates or declining to write insurance for
people who live in certain areas. Id. at 290.
17. Id. at 297–98.
18. No. 14-cv-5460, 2015 WL 5521769 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015).
19. 369 F. Supp. 3d 362 (D. Conn. 2019).
20. Frederick, 2015 WL 5521769, at *2–3.
21. CoreLogic, 369 F. Supp. 3d at 370–75.
22. In 2019, HUD released a proposed rule that will severely disable disparate impact
theory and create an algorithmic exception under the FHA. See HUD’s Implementation of the
Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42,854 (proposed Aug. 19, 2019)
(to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). Under this exception, a defendant whose policies or
practices involve the use of an algorithm is exempt from liability as long as the inputs in its
algorithm are not “substitutes or close proxies” for protected characteristics. The rule also
immunizes landlords from discrimination claims if they use an algorithmic tool developed and
maintained by a recognized third party. The rule does not explicitly mention tenant screening
companies, so it is unclear how the landscape of liability will shift once HUD publishes the
final rule. It is vital that courts stick to federal judicial precedent, like NAACP and CoreLogic,
that broadly interprets the FHA to cover a variety of intermediaries. See Andrew D. Selbst, A
New HUD Rule Would Effectively Encourage Discrimination by Algorithm, SLATE (Aug. 19,
2019,
10:51
AM),
https://slate.com/technology/2019/08/hud-disparate-impactdiscrimination-algorithm.html [https://perma.cc/AK7N-E9RJ]; see also Morgan Baskin,
Trump Wants to Give Landlords Even More Power over People with Criminal Records, VICE
(Sept. 7, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/vb5bm3/trump-wants-to-
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which parties the FHA should apply to. The two federal district court
decisions presented in this Note, rendered by the Southern District of New
York and the District of Connecticut respectively, do not represent binding
national authority. This Note proposes a much-needed resolution that
suggests a broad interpretation of § 3604, in accordance with the Seventh
Circuit in NAACP, that holds tenant screening companies liable.
Part I provides an overview of the FHA and the role of tenant screening
companies in the housing market. Most importantly, it explores how courts
have treated housing intermediaries under the FHA, such as the Seventh
Circuit in NAACP, which found insurance companies liable under § 3604.23
Part II examines two opposing standpoints on whether tenant screening
companies should be liable for their disparate impact under the FHA,
specifically § 3604. Some proponents of tenant screening services point to
the Southern District of New York’s decision in Frederick24 to urge courts
to interpret § 3604 narrowly to only cover entities engaged in the sale or
rental of a dwelling.25 Meanwhile, critics of tenant screening services
believe § 3604 extends to intermediaries, not just direct housing providers.26
Their opinion is in accordance with another federal district court opinion,
CoreLogic. Part II also explores the policies behind proponents’ and critics’
views.
Part III concludes that CoreLogic’s solution to hold tenant screening
companies liable fits more squarely with NAACP’s interpretation of the FHA
and accordingly proposes that courts hold tenant screening companies liable
under § 3604. In NAACP, the Seventh Circuit put forth a compelling
interpretation of intermediary liability under § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) that
should extend to tenant screening companies.27 Tenant screening companies
have a disparate impact on both racial and gender minorities.28 In order for
future courts to comply with federal judicial precedent, the FHA’s legislative
history, and HUD’s administrative guidance, it is imperative that they follow
NAACP’s broad interpretation of § 3604 and the FHA generally.

give-landlords-even-more-power-over-people-with-criminal-records
[https://perma.cc/TV7B-VWUS].
23. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
24. Frederick, 2015 WL 5521769, at *2–3.
25. Defendant CoreLogic Rental Property Solutions, LLC’s Memorandum in Support of
Its Motion to Dismiss at 9–10, Conn. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. CoreLogic Rental Prop. Sols., LLC,
369 F. Supp. 3d 362 (D. Conn. 2019) (No. 3:18 Civ. 00705) [hereinafter CoreLogic’s Motion
to Dismiss]; see also Memorandum in Support of Experian Information Solutions, Inc.’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint at 5, Frederick, 2015 WL 5521769
(No. 14-cv-5460) [hereinafter Experian’s Motion to Dismiss]; Trans Union, LLC’s
Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint at 2, Frederick, 2015 WL 5521769 (No. 14-cv-5460) [hereinafter TransUnion’s
Motion to Dismiss].
26. Ehman, supra note 4, at 7–8; see also Arroyo v. CoreLogic, NAT’L HOUSING L.
PROJECT (July 31, 2018), https://www.nhlp.org/our-initiatives/arroyo-v-corelogic/#_ftnref12
[https://perma.cc/5YGE-YRZX].
27. NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 297–301 (7th Cir. 1992).
28. Ehman, supra note 4, at 3–5.
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I. THE FHA AND TENANT SCREENING COMPANIES: PROTECTING A
TENANT’S RIGHT TO EQUAL ACCESS TO HOUSING
Congress created the FHA to eradicate discriminatory housing practices
within the United States economy29 and to “ensure the removal of artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers when the barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of impermissible characteristics.”30 This Part
provides relevant background on the FHA and the role that tenant screening
companies play in the housing market—chief among them providing credit,
criminal, and eviction histories of prospective tenants to housing providers.
Part I.A explains the background of the FHA. It focuses on why Congress
created the FHA, along with the two major theories underlying the Act:
disparate treatment and disparate impact. Part I.B explores the role that
tenant screening companies and background screening reports play in the
housing context, namely in reporting a tenant’s credit information, criminal
history, and eviction data. Finally, Part I.C delves into how the FHA does
not define which actors it applies to and how this issue has been handled by
courts, like the Seventh Circuit, which have indicated that the Act broadly
applies to intermediaries like insurance companies.
A. The FHA: Discriminatory Intent and Impact
The FHA prohibits discrimination by direct housing providers and other
entities against individuals based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status,
and national origin.31 HUD’s Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity
investigates complaints under the FHA and oversees enforcement of the
Act.32 Section 3604(a) of the Act makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or
rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale
or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”33 In
accordance with Congress’s intent to provide fair housing throughout the
United States,34 the U.S. Supreme Court and other federal courts construe the
FHA’s language broadly and as requiring “generous construction.”35
29. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2521 (2015).
30. United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
31. The Fair Housing Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 21, 2017), https://
www.justice.gov/crt/fair-housing-act-1 [https://perma.cc/5BPZ-L4SL]. In 2017, a federal
court held that the term “sex” also encompasses discrimination based on sexual orientation
and gender identity. Smith v. Avanti, 249 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1200 (D. Colo. 2017).
32. See Housing Discrimination Under the Fair Housing Act, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING &
URB. DEV., https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/fair_housing_
act_overview [https://perma.cc/HYT7-897H] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2018) (emphasis added). Likewise, it is unlawful “to
discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a
dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” Id. § 3604(b).
34. See id. § 3601.
35. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 212 (1972); see also Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971) (holding that civil rights statutes should be read
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FHA discrimination claims fall into two distinct categories: disparate
treatment and disparate impact.36 In disparate treatment claims, plaintiffs
allege that a defendant’s housing decision was motivated by discriminatory
Disparate impact claims do not require a showing of
animus.37
discriminatory intent, but instead plaintiffs assert that a defendant’s action or
policy has or will have a disproportionate “adverse impact” against a group
protected under the FHA.38
For disparate treatment claims, HUD and most, if not all, courts utilize the
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green39 standard.40 Under this standard, the
plaintiff first has the burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination.41
If the plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant must then articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.42 If the defendant
satisfies that burden, the plaintiff can still prevail by proving that the
defendant’s reasons are mere pretext.43
While disparate treatment claims typically follow the three-step, burdenshifting test articulated in McDonnell Douglas, circuit courts have struggled
to agree on a uniform test for disparate impact theory.44 In 2013, HUD
created a disparate impact burden-shifting framework that courts should
use.45 Under HUD’s regulations, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie
case by showing that the defendant’s practice has or will have a
discriminatory effect on a protected class.46 The burden then shifts to the
defendant to prove that the practice is necessary to achieve a substantial,
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest.47 If the defendant satisfies its burden,
the plaintiff can still prevail by proving that defendant’s interests can be met
through less discriminatory means.48 Ultimately, if the plaintiff cannot make
this showing, the defendant prevails.49
expansively to fulfill their purpose); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987, 1022
(E.D. Pa. 1976).
36. Kaitlin A. Bridges, Note, Justifying Facial Discrimination by Government Defendants
Under the Fair Housing Act: Which Standard to Apply?, 73 MO. L. REV. 177, 178 (2008).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 178–79; see also NFHA Disparate Impact Information, NAT’L FAIR HOUSING
ALLIANCE, https://nationalfairhousing.org/disparateimpact/ [https://perma.cc/BE6V-Q2ZU]
(last visited Apr. 12, 2020). Typically, disparate impact theory has targeted exclusionary
zoning, home insurance standards, screening devices used by landlords, and other areas.
Robert G. Schwemm, Fair Housing Litigation After Inclusive Communities: What’s New and
What’s Not, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 106, 107–08 (2015).
39. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
40. Id. at 802–06; see, e.g., United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176, 1178 (8th Cir. 1992);
HUD v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 870 (11th Cir. 1990).
41. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 804.
44. See Rebecca Oyama, Note, Do Not (Re)Enter: The Rise of Criminal Background
Tenant Screening as a Violation of the Fair Housing Act, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 181, 203
(2009).
45. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2020).
46. Id. § 100.500(c)(1).
47. Id. § 100.500(c)(2).
48. Id. § 100.500(c)(3).
49. Id. § 100.500(b)(1)(ii).
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In 2015, the Supreme Court’s Texas Department of Housing & Community
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.50 decision imposed an
additional step on plaintiffs making disparate impact claims.51 There, the
Court affirmed disparate impact liability as a theory under § 3604(a) and
§ 3605 of the FHA.52 Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion relied heavily on
the logic of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,53 which had interpreted Title VII’s
language to encompass disparate impact claims.54 Title VII makes it “an
unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . [to] otherwise adversely
affect [an employee’s] status as an employee, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”55 Like the phrase “otherwise
adversely affect” in Title VII,56 “otherwise make unavailable . . . a dwelling”
in FHA § 3604(a)57 is a catchall phrase that signals “a shift in emphasis from
an actor’s intent to the consequences of his actions.”58 Because the FHA
exists to combat housing discrimination and racial segregation,59 Justice
Kennedy opined that disparate impact liability “permits plaintiffs to
counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy
classification as disparate treatment.”60
While Justice Kennedy supported a broad and inclusive reading of the
FHA, he also expressed concern that housing providers could be liable for
racial disparities that they were not responsible for creating.61 Accordingly,
the Court held that, in addition to HUD’s framework,62 a plaintiff must
produce statistical evidence in their prima facie case that demonstrates a
robust causal connection between the defendant’s practice and the
discriminatory effect.63 By creating this robust causality standard, the Court
hoped that the valid interests of housing authorities and private developers
would limit disparate impact liability.64 That is, if housing authorities and
50. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
51. Id. at 2522–23; see also MICHAEL W. SKOJEC & MICHAEL P. CIANFICHI, NAT’L
MULTIFAMILY HOUS. COUNCIL & NAT’L APARTMENT ASS’N, DISPARATE IMPACT AND FAIR
HOUSING: NEW DEVELOPMENTS LEGAL SUMMARY 3, 5–6 (2017), https://www.naahq.org/
sites/default/files/disparate_impact_and_fair_housing_developments-legal_summary-1017final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4M9Y-9LNA].
52. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2518.
53. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
54. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2516–17 (“Before turning to the FHA, however, it is
necessary to consider . . . other antidiscrimination statutes that preceded it.”).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2018) (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. Id. § 3604(a).
58. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2519.
59. See id. at 2522 (“[T]he FHA aims to ensure that . . . [housing authorities’] priorities
can be achieved without arbitrarily creating discriminatory effects or perpetuating
segregation.”).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2523.
62. See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text.
63. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
64. Id. at 2522; see also Steven Cummings, Note, Twiqbal, Inc.: Finding DisparateImpact Claims Cognizable Under the Fair Housing Act and Raising Serious Concerns in the
Process, 80 ALB. L. REV. 381, 393 (2016/2017).
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developers can prove that a policy is necessary to achieve a valid interest,
then the Court will allow the defendants to maintain the policy.65 Justice
Kennedy found that policies have to constitute “artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers” to housing to invoke disparate impact liability.66
Federal courts have aligned with this opinion and handed victories to housing
providers when plaintiffs have not satisfied their prima facie burden in
accordance with Inclusive Communities’s robust causality standard.67
B. Tenant Screening and the Housing Market’s Reliance on Background
Screening Reports
Landlords increasingly use tenant screening companies to determine if a
prospective tenant is qualified to reside in their property—or, more
specifically, if an individual would make for a “good tenant” and would not
be a future liability.68 Although housing providers can pursue tenant
background checks themselves, they typically employ tenant screening
companies that can provide instant and extensive background information on
a rental applicant.69 Tenant screening companies dispense information on a
tenant’s eviction history, credit score, criminal records, and civil litigation
background.70 In the past, more than 72 percent of housing providers have
used a tenant screening company to screen tenants.71 Some of these
companies have online databases that provide landlords with instant access
to a tenant report, while others offer specialized services in person.72 These
reports can cost between thirty-five and seventy-five dollars, and many
housing providers have required applicants to cover the associated costs.73

65. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522–23; see also Cummings, supra note 64, at 393
(“While the Court did not explicitly state that the notion of ‘prov[ing a policy] is necessary to
achieve a valid interest’ was an affirmative defense, such an explicit statement would have
been redundant.” (alteration in original) (quoting Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523)).
66. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 431 (1971)).
67. SKOJEC & CIANFICHI, supra note 51, at 8. By adopting Inclusive Communities’s robust
causality standard, federal courts are protecting defendants. See Lauren Clatch, Inclusive
Communities and the Question of Impact: Pro-plaintiff?, MINN. L. REV. (Dec. 8, 2016),
https://www.minnesotalawreview.org/2016/12/inclusive-communities-and-the-question-ofimpact/ [https://perma.cc/K6N2-M396] (“Specifically, if the plaintiff cannot pass the hurdle
of a prima facie case, the case is subject to motions to dismiss, essentially cutting the claim at
its knees. A number of cases citing Inclusive Communities have been dismissed for failure to
state a claim.”).
68. Eric Dunn & Marina Grabchuk, Background Checks and Social Effects:
Contemporary Residential Tenant-Screening Problems in Washington State, 9 SEATTLE J.
SOC. JUST. 319, 322 (2010).
69. Id. at 323.
70. Id. at 320.
71. This data is based on a survey of property managers in Minneapolis and Saint Paul
conducted by HousingLink. See HOUSINGLINK, TENANT SCREENING AGENCIES IN THE TWIN
CITIES: AN OVERVIEW OF SCREENING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON RENTERS 6, 31 (2004),
https://www.housinglink.org/Files/Tenant_Screening.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QBV-SLNN].
72. Id. at 18–19. These local agencies often distribute tenant information through fax or
the internet. Id. at 18.
73. Dunn & Grabchuk, supra note 68, at 323.
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A landlord may request that tenant screening companies include specific
tenant criteria in their reports.74 These criteria “range from amorphous
judgments about an applicant’s desirability to formal admission policies that
evaluate applicants across a wide spectrum of factors.”75 When generating a
report, a tenant screening company utilizes public records to pull a
prospective tenant’s credit information, criminal history, and prior eviction
and court records.76 The report may also include open-ended “lifestyle
information” regarding the tenant’s marital history, past property damage,
pet ownership, and general reputation.77 Instead of simply providing raw
information on a tenant, many tenant screening companies take a more direct
role and deliver a “score,” “approval,” or “recommendation” based on the
data they obtain.78 All of this information is retrievable upon the landlord’s
request and formatted to provide an analysis of the tenant’s “potential as a
liability.”79 A tenant who has faced bankruptcy, prior eviction, or a felony
conviction usually has the hardest time finding housing because of this
process.80
The following subsections explore the specific data that tenant screening
companies collect on prospective tenants. Part I.B.1 discusses how screening
companies obtain and report tenant credit information. Part I.B.2 explains
how tenant screening companies report criminal history. Part I.B.3
illuminates the process that tenant screening companies utilize to report a
prospective tenant’s prior eviction history.

74. See, e.g., Kasia Manolas, Tenant Screening Checklist for Landlords, AVAIL (Aug. 7,
2019),
https://www.avail.co/education/articles/tenant-screening-checklist-for-landlords
[https://perma.cc/WEV3-HBB6].
75. Dunn & Grabchuk, supra note 68, at 322.
76. See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 71, at 17.
77. Robert R. Stauffer, Note, Tenant Blacklisting: Tenant Screening Services and the
Right to Privacy, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 239, 243 (1987).
78. Ehman, supra note 4, at 2; see, e.g., Evans v. UDR, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 675, 678
(E.D.N.C. 2009) (involving a tenant screening company that recommended that the landlord
deny an application because of the applicant’s arrest and conviction record); see also Tenant
Screening, RENTSCREENER, https://www.rentscreener.com/tenant-screening [https://
perma.cc/7N9T-J4T3] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (“We will take the results and compile a
rent report with a grade and recommendation.”); Tenant Verification Services from
SmartMove, TRANSUNION, https://www.mysmartmove.com/SmartMove/tenant-verificationservice.page [https://perma.cc/Y5BL-QDE2] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (“TransUnion
SmartMove’s tenant verification and screening services make choosing renters an efficient,
simple, and cost-effective process. In fact, at the end of the tenant verification process, you’ll
get a fully-customized leasing recommendation based on the amount of risk that you’re willing
to allow in your tenants, as well as their credit report, Income Insights repor[t], eviction
history, ResidentScore and background check.”).
79. See David J. D’Urso, Tenant Screening Agencies: Implications for Landlords and
Tenants, 26 REAL EST. L.J. 44, 50 (1997).
80. These tenants are generally “categorically excluded.” Dunn & Grabchuk, supra note
68, at 323.
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1. Background Reports and Credit Information
Consumer credit reports include information relating to individuals’ credit
worthiness to determine if they qualify for a dwelling unit.81 Most credit
reporting agencies, such as Equifax, TransUnion, and Experian,82 collect
financial data based on a consumer’s interactions with lenders, credit card
companies, and other financial institutions.83 A tenant screening company
usually secures the financial data from a credit reporting agency to include
in its screening reports.84 Equifax, TransUnion, and Experian also have
screening arms that provide background reports containing a tenant’s credit
information, rental history, criminal records, and other similar background
information to landlords.85 Credit information can include a prospective
tenant’s personal information, such as their name, address, and social
security number.86 It can also contain the tenant’s current and past credit
accounts, information on companies that have pulled the tenant’s credit
report, and state and county records on the tenant’s bankruptcies, tax liens,
and past due accounts.87
2. Background Reports and Criminal History
Landlords commonly hire tenant screening companies to conduct
comprehensive checks on a tenant’s criminal history.88 Four types of
criminal records can show up on a screening report: arrest records, criminal
court records, corrections records, and state criminal repository records.89
Tenant screening companies’ main sources of information for these records
are executive branch criminal records repositories, courts and offices of court
81. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.3(c)(3) (West 2000).
82. These are the three major credit bureaus. See What Is a Credit Report and What Does
It Include?, EQUIFAX, https://www.equifax.com/personal/education/credit/report/what-is-acredit-report-and-what-does-it-include [https://perma.cc/4FRW-JY8G] (last visited Apr. 12,
2020).
83. What Is a Credit Report?, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (June 8, 2017),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-credit-report-en-309/
[https://
perma.cc/43R4-LXYH].
84. See, e.g., Jennifer Henry, Use a Tenant Screening Service That Pays Off, EQUIFAX
(June 16, 2014), https://insight.equifax.com/use-a-tenant-screening-service-that-pays-off/
[https://perma.cc/PX5S-XGBM].
85. Id. (“[The Equifax Resident Screening] . . . program assembles and provides you with
all available credit, rental history, employment verification and criminal record information
from across the country.”).
86. See, e.g., Your Credit Report, FED. RES. BANK S.F., https://www.hsh.com/
pdf/uncle_sam/frb_sf/creditreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RVG-94G6] (last visited Apr. 12,
2020).
87. Id.
88. Ehman, supra note 4, at 2–3.
89. Criminal records generally come from state criminal justice systems; as such, no truly
“nationwide” criminal records database exists. Lynn Peterson, Not All Criminal Records
Checks Are Created Equal, VIRTUAL CHASE (Mar. 2, 2005), https://
archive.virtualchase.justia.com/articles/archive/criminal_checks.html
[https://perma.cc/
Q6MF-VRRL]. Some screening companies conduct thorough searches of criminal records
across the country. Id.
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administration, and commercial information vendors.90 For instance, a
majority of screening companies in Minneapolis and St. Paul utilize the
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension database for information on
tenants’ arrests and convictions.91 As is common practice, the tenant
screening companies supplement this database information with county and
federal records, reporting anything that they find.92 Although most tenant
screening companies search for criminal records in local databases or in
jurisdictions where the tenant has lived, a few offer “50-state” background
checks that comb through court criminal records nationwide.93
Sometimes, screening companies obtain information from a database only
by searching a tenant’s name and date of birth.94 If the company discovers a
criminal record, it may or may not research the circumstances surrounding
the incident and report the final disposition data to the landlord.95 For
instance, a screening report may disclose that a previous landlord filed a
criminal suit against the tenant but not that the charges were eventually
dropped.96
3. Background Reports and Eviction Data
When property owners wish to remove a tenant, they can file a lawsuit to
have the tenant evicted.97 Generally, an eviction, or unlawful detainer,
occurs when landlords terminate rental agreements with tenants who then fail
to move out.98 As part of a background check, landlords often obtain data
on prospective applicants’ prior eviction histories to determine if they will be
suitable future tenants.99 Tenant screening companies investigate if an
applicant was ever a defendant in an eviction lawsuit and include this
“eviction history report” as part of their full background check.100 An
eviction history report can include a case number, location, the plaintiff’s
90. James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of
Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 179 (2008).
91. Law enforcement agencies report juvenile and adult felony and misdemeanor arrests
to the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension. HOUSINGLINK, supra note 71, at 20–21.
92. See id. at 21.
93. CMTY. LEGAL SERVS., INC. ET AL., TRANSITION PAPER FOR THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION: IT’S TIME TO REGULATE THE BACKGROUND SCREENING INDUSTRY 8 (2008).
94. See id.
95. Stauffer, supra note 77, at 242; see also PERSIS S. YU & SHARON M. DIETRICH, NAT’L
CONSUMER LAW CTR., BROKEN RECORDS: HOW ERRORS BY CRIMINAL BACKGROUND
CHECKING
COMPANIES
HARM
WORKERS
AND
BUSINESSES
24
(2012),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/broken-records-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SJ6X-LA6H].
96. See id.
97. See, e.g., Termination of Tenancy, TENANTS UNION WASH. ST., https://
tenantsunion.org/rights/termination-of-tenancy [https://perma.cc/CY98-J7ZT] (last visited
Apr. 12, 2020).
98. Id.
99. See Eviction History Reports for Tenant Screening, AM. APARTMENT OWNERS ASS’N,
https://www.american-apartment-owners-association.org/tenant-screening/eviction-history/
[https://perma.cc/AM9U-3MZW] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
100. Id.
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identity, when the case was satisfied, judgment date, and judgment
amount.101
When requesting a background screening report, a landlord may have the
option of seeking state-specific or nationwide records.102 Tenant screening
companies can get their eviction data from court databases.103 For example,
in Washington, screening companies utilize the Superior Court Management
Information System, a statewide electronic database, to obtain eviction
information.104 Some court administrative offices also sell court eviction
case data to screening companies, knowing that it will be used to prepare
tenant screening reports.105
When scouring statewide eviction databases, a tenant screening company
may use a tenant’s name, and sometimes address, to discover previous
eviction records.106 As with criminal history searches, this can be
problematic because the background screening report likely includes almost
no context on what actually occurred between the prospective tenant and their
prior landlord.107 Other details, such as who sued whom, which party
prevailed in the legal dispute, whether the case settled, and whether the
parties ultimately dropped the case, may be excluded.108 If a tenant stopped
paying rent for a legitimate reason—for instance, because the property was
in uninhabitable condition—the report may only show that the tenant was
involved in an eviction dispute and provide no further context.109
C. Liability of Intermediaries Under the FHA: The Seventh Circuit in
NAACP
The FHA is unclear about which specific actors it subjects to liability. The
Act does not explicitly define the terms “make unavailable” or “service” in
§ 3604(a) and § 3604(b), respectively.110 The Act bans discriminatory
policies and practices but does not say which actors can be liable under the
Act.111 To combat the ambiguity Congress created,112 courts have
acknowledged that the term “make unavailable” “might extend to ‘other
actors who, though not owners or agents, are in a position directly to deny a

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Ehman, supra note 4, at 4.
104. Dunn & Grabchuk, supra note 68, at 326.
105. See, e.g., Weisent v. Subaqua Corp., No. 102108/07, 2007 WL 2140947, at *1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. July 5, 2007) (discussing how the state’s Office of Court Administration was selling
eviction case data to tenant screening bureaus).
106. Anne Machalinksi, The Dreaded Tenant Blacklist: What You Need to Know, BRICK
UNDERGROUND (Dec. 29, 2017, 10:30 AM), https://www.brickunderground.com/blog/2014/
05/tenant_blacklist [https://perma.cc/AB94-EEPB].
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 298 (7th Cir. 1992).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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member of a protected group housing rights.’”113 Similarly, federal courts
have long validated the broad reach of the language in § 3604 by holding that
it applies beyond housing providers to insurance companies.114
In a leading decision, NAACP, the Seventh Circuit held that insurance
redlining practices violate the FHA.115 The NAACP, its Milwaukee branch,
and eight of its members (the “Plaintiffs”) commenced a suit against
American Family Mutual Insurance Company (the “Defendant”) for its
redlining practices in Milwaukee.116 Redlining constitutes charging “higher
rates or declining to write insurance for people who live in particular
areas.”117 The Plaintiffs asserted that these redlining practices were a form
of racial discrimination that violated the FHA because the Defendant drew
these lines to decline to insure areas with large minority populations.118 The
Plaintiffs further argued that when insurers redline areas with minorities, they
raise costs and deny housing based on protected characteristics.119
In their complaint, the Plaintiffs claimed that three sections of the FHA
addressed “insurance sold (or withheld) in connection with the purchase of a
dwelling: 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), 3604(b), and 3605.”120 Judge Easterbrook,
writing for the Seventh Circuit, held that the actions of insurance companies
do not fit within the contours of § 3605.121 Section 3605 of the FHA makes
it unlawful for those engaging in real estate–related transactions, such as
providing financial assistance with home ownership, to discriminate.122 The
court concluded that “[i]t would strain language past the breaking point to
treat property or casualty insurance as ‘financial assistance’—let alone as
assistance ‘for purchasing . . . a dwelling.’”123
However, the court did find merit in the Plaintiffs’ argument regarding
§ 3604.124 Relying on § 3604(a), the Plaintiffs asserted that by refusing to
write insurance policies or by setting a price too high, an insurer “make[s a
dwelling] unavailable” to a buyer.125 The court agreed with this analysis
because a lack of insurance leads to the denial of a loan, and thus, “no loan,

113. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1360 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Mich. Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 344 (6th Cir. 1994)).
114. See, e.g., Burrell v. State Farm & Cas. Co., 226 F. Supp. 2d 427, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(finding it reasonable for the FHA to cover discrimination in the provision of insurance);
Nationwide Mut. Ins., 52 F.3d at 1360 (upholding the district court’s finding that insurance
underwriting practices are covered under the FHA).
115. NAACP, 978 F.2d at 297–301.
116. Id. at 290.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 297.
121. Id.
122. The Act defines real estate–related transactions as “[t]he making or purchasing of
loans or providing other financial assistance . . . for purchasing, constructing, improving,
repairing, or maintaining a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3605(b)(1)(a) (2018).
123. NAACP, 978 F.2d at 297 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3605(b)(1)(a)).
124. Id. at 297–98.
125. Id. at 297.
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no house; lack of insurance thus makes housing unavailable.”126 Regarding
§ 3604(b), the Plaintiffs asserted that property insurance is a “service”
rendered “in connection” with the “sale or rental of a dwelling.”127 The court
agreed, finding that “[i]f the world of commerce is divided between ‘goods’
and ‘services,’ then insurers supply a ‘service.’”128 The court held that “in
connection” may be read broadly to serve the FHA’s purpose of removing
obstacles that restrict equal access to housing.129
The court supported its analysis by holding that nothing in the FHA’s text
permits it to reject the Plaintiff’s proposed readings.130 Since the FHA does
not define “make unavailable” or “service,” Congress created ambiguity131
that has since been clarified with respect to insurance companies. Although
other circuits, such as the Fourth Circuit in Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance
Cos.,132 have held that the FHA is inapplicable to insurance and that
Congress disapproved of the Act reaching so far,133 the NAACP court
In 1988, Congress passed
rejected this judicial interpretation.134
amendments to the FHA that authorized HUD to carry out the Act.135
According to the court, Congress gave this authorization of power knowing
that present and future HUD secretaries believed that insurance redlining
should be covered under § 3604.136 Once Congress delegated this power, the
secretary at the time used his new rulemaking powers to issue regulations
“that include[d], among the conduct prohibited by [FHA] § 3604: ‘[r]efusing
to provide . . . property or hazard insurance for dwellings or providing
such . . . insurance differently because of race.’”137 Per the court in NAACP,
§ 3604 of the FHA should be construed according to the secretary’s
interpretation because courts should respect an agency’s “plausible
construction.”138 The court found that § 3604 applied to the discriminatory
denial of insurance and discriminatory pricing that precludes racial
minorities from home ownership.139
Since NAACP, both HUD and other federal courts have taken the view that
insurance redlining constitutes a violation of the FHA. In 2016, HUD refused
to grant a safe harbor exemption to property insurers to disparate impact
liability, explaining that such a categorical exemption would be inconsistent
with the broad purpose and obligations of the FHA.140 Similarly, the D.C.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 298.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984).
133. See generally id.
134. NAACP, 978 F.2d at 298–301.
135. Id. at 300.
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4)).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 301.
140. Application of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard to Insurance;
Correction, 81 Fed. Reg. 69,012 (Oct. 5, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100); see also
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Circuit,141 the Southern District of New York,142 and the Sixth Circuit143
have all come out in support of NAACP, extending the application of the FHA
beyond direct housing providers to insurance companies that deny coverage
to minority populations.
II. TO “OTHERWISE MAKE UNAVAILABLE”: SHOULD § 3604 OF THE FHA
ENCOMPASS TENANT SCREENING LIABILITY?
There are two divergent views on whether tenant screening companies
should face liability under the FHA. This Part discusses the distinct federal
district court interpretations of § 3604 on which these views rely. Part II.A
discusses the view held by tenant screening companies and their
proponents—that tenant screening services are a vital part of the housing
industry. Some supporters point to the Southern District of New York’s
interpretation of § 3604 in Frederick144 and argue that the clause contains a
“sale or rental” requirement that precludes tenant screening company
liability. Part II.B discusses the view held by critics of screening services—
that tenant screening companies produce background reports that are
inaccurate, misleading, and highly discriminatory. These critics believe that
§ 3604 should be interpreted in accordance with the District of Connecticut
in CoreLogic, which broadly interpreted the “otherwise make unavailable”
language in § 3604(a) to encompass tenant screening companies.145
Since each view finds support in a federal district court decision, there
exists no nationally binding authority on the question of tenant screening
company liability under the FHA. Therefore, discussion of the two
interpretations is significant as future courts and HUD will likely grapple
with whether tenant screening companies should be liable under § 3604.146
A. Protecting Tenant Screening Companies from Liability Under § 3604
Proponents of tenant screening companies believe background screening
reports are a vital part of housing and that the FHA should not apply to these
screening companies. Part II.A.1 discusses proponents’ reliance on
Frederick147 to support a narrow interpretation of § 3604 that does not cover
tenant screening companies. Part II.A.2 describes policy reasons that
Amy M. Glassman, HUD Issues Statement on Applicability of Disparate Impact Liability to
Insurance Industry, BALLARD SPAHR LLP (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.ballardspahr.com/
alertspublications/legalalerts/2016-10-10-hud-issues-statement-on-applicability-of-disparateimpact-liability-to-insurance-industry [https://perma.cc/KLD5-P9CX].
141. See generally Nat’l Fair Hous. All., Inc., v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp.
2d 46 (D.D.C. 2002).
142. See generally Burrell v. State Farm & Cas. Co., 226 F. Supp. 2d 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
143. See generally Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351 (6th Cir. 1995).
144. Frederick v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., No. 14-cv-5460, 2015 WL 5521769, at
*2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015).
145. Conn. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. CoreLogic Rental Prop. Sols., LLC, 369 F. Supp. 3d 362,
370–75 (D. Conn. 2019).
146. Courts and HUD are likely to grapple with this question in the future because of
HUD’s most recent proposal to modify the FHA’s disparate impact theory. See supra note 22.
147. Frederick, 2015 WL 5521769, at *2–3.
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proponents point to when arguing why tenant screening services are
beneficial—mainly that they prevent future tenant liability.
1. Limiting § 3604 to the “Sale or Rental” of Housing: Southern District of
New York in Frederick
In defending their right to create tenant background screening reports,
some proponents claim that § 3604 of the FHA should be interpreted to apply
only to those entities that directly refuse to sell or rent housing to tenants.148
The Southern District of New York in Frederick appears to support this
interpretation,149 which some defendants use to argue that § 3604 of the FHA
should be limited only to housing providers.150
In Frederick, Ezekiel Frederick filed claims against thirteen defendants,151
contending that their practices caused a decrease in his credit score, which
harmed his ability to obtain financing to purchase real estate.152 Frederick
alleged that the defendants targeted him for these practices based on his race
and, accordingly, violated § 3604(a) of the FHA by “‘otherwise [making]
unavailable’ to him a variety of housing opportunities.”153 Each of the
thirteen defendants filed a motion to dismiss Frederick’s FHA claim.154
The majority of the defendants in Frederick, including Capital One,
regularly participate in credit reporting practices by selling consumer credit
information.155 Defendants TransUnion LLC and Experian Information
Solutions, Inc. also separately, although not in this case, engage in
background reporting by providing screening reports to housing providers.156
In their motions to dismiss, Defendants TransUnion LLC and Experian
Information Solutions, Inc. asserted that because they did not refuse to sell
or rent housing to Frederick, the FHA was inapplicable to their credit
reporting actions.157

148. CoreLogic’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 25, at 9–10; see also Experian’s Motion
to Dismiss, supra note 25, at 5; TransUnion’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 25, at 2.
149. See Frederick, 2015 WL 5521769, at *2–3.
150. CoreLogic, 369 F. Supp. 3d at 372–73.
151. The thirteen defendants include: “Capital One Bank (USA) N.A. (‘Capital One’) and
David Ginzburg; Anderson Financial Network Inc. (‘AFNI’) and Ronald Greene; Diversified
Consultants Inc. (‘Diversified’) and Charlotte Zehnder; Midland Credit Management, Inc.
(‘Midland’); Pinnacle Credit Services, LLC (‘Pinnacle’) and Tina Vincelli;, Experian
Information Solutions, Inc. (‘Experian’); TransUnion LLC (‘TransUnion’); IC System Inc.
(‘ICS’); and the Fair Isaac Corporation (‘FICO’).” Frederick, 2015 WL 5521769, at *1.
152. Id.
153. Id. at *1–2 (quoting Second Amended Complaint at 35–37, Frederick, 2015 WL
5521769 (No. 14-cv-5460)).
154. Id. at *1.
155. See Eric Volkman, When Does Capital One Report Credit Utilization to Bureaus?,
ASCENT (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.fool.com/the-ascent/credit-cards/articles/when-doescapital-one-report-credit-utilization-to-bureaus/ [https://perma.cc/4Z33-9H2T].
156. They are credit reporting agencies that landlords rely on to secure background
information on tenants. See supra Part I.B.I.
157. Experian’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 25, at 5; see also TransUnion’s Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 25, at 2.
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The court examined § 3604(a) of the FHA, acknowledging that courts are
required to give “generous construction” to the FHA.158 When analyzing the
FHA’s language, the court considered the argument that because the
defendants did not refuse to sell or rent housing to Frederick, they were not
liable under the Act.159 District Judge Alison J. Nathan concluded that the
defendants’ practices did not fall within the bounds of the FHA.160 The court
reasoned that a relationship between the challenged practice and the “sale or
rental” of housing was absolutely necessary under § 3604 and that credit
reporting practices were not intrinsically related to real estate transactions.161
According to Judge Nathan, adopting Frederick’s claim that any injury to
one’s credit score “otherwise make[s] unavailable” housing under § 3604
would improperly make all credit reporting disputes potential FHA
violations.162 The court believed that certain credit reporting practices, even
if they affected one’s credit score and ability to obtain housing, were too far
removed from the FHA’s “sale or rental” clause.163 Per Judge Nathan,
“[s]uch a broad construction of the FHA is not supported by the text, which
primarily concerns the ‘sale or rental’ of housing, nor has it been adopted by
any other court.”164 The court granted each of the thirteen defendants’
motions to dismiss Frederick’s FHA claims.165
2. Tenant Screening Reports Are a Vital and Necessary Part of the Housing
Market
In addition to advocating for their own narrow interpretation of the FHA,
proponents of the screening process believe that tenant screening companies
provide useful services to landlords and tenants.166 They allow landlords to
gain comprehensive information on a tenant while lowering the high costs
associated with evictions and tenant misbehavior.167 Many acknowledge that
screening can raise issues of accuracy but point to the federal Fair Credit

158. Frederick, 2015 WL 5521769, at *2 (quoting Hack v. President of Yale Coll., 237
F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 2000)).
159. See id.
160. Id. at *3.
161. Id. at *2.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at *3.
166. See Andrea Collatz, The Top 11 Benefits of Online Tenant Screening, TRANSUNION
(Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.mysmartmove.com/SmartMove/blog/top-11-benefits-onlinetenant-screening.page [https://perma.cc/VXS9-BYUY]; The American Apartment Owners
Association, the Largest Landlord Association in the Country Offers a Variety of Tenant
Screening Services to Meet All Your Tenant Screening Service Needs, AM. APARTMENT
OWNERS ASS’N, https://www.american-apartment-owners-association.org/tenant-screeningservices [https://perma.cc/ZPF6-M5EG] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) [hereinafter Tenant
Screening Services].
167. D’Urso, supra note 79, at 50–55.
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Reporting Act168 (FCRA), rather than the FHA, as the statute to police
inaccurate entries.169
Tenant screening companies provide landlords with comprehensive
background information on tenants before they enter into lease agreements
with them.170 They provide an instantly accessible service that is relatively
effortless on the part of landlords.171 This allows landlords to easily protect
themselves from future liabilities including “lost rents, apartment repairs,
[and] court costs.”172 Tenant screening companies, such as the American
Apartment Owners Association, advertise themselves as resources that
landlords can use to “avoid renting to tenants who are unlikely to pay rent on
time and may damage . . . [their] rental property.”173 Apart from the varying
benefits that these screening reports provide, they also reveal what
information a tenant did not initially disclose in their application.174 A full
report has the ability to guarantee that a tenant who lied on their rental
application does not enter a housing provider’s property.175
To proponents of screening companies, a background report on a
prospective tenant’s criminal or prior eviction history is essential because
“the propensity to commit a violent crime puts other tenants and neighbors
at risk . . . [while] a prior eviction speaks volumes about a tenant.”176
Inclusion of prior criminal and eviction data enhances the behavioral
suitability of prospective tenants, meaning that they “will follow the rules,
fulfill other nonfinancial obligations of the tenancy, and live harmoniously
in the community.”177 Likewise, reporting credit information ensures
financial suitability, which determines if a tenant can meet their pecuniary
obligations.178

168. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12, 15, and 31 U.S.C.).
169. D’Urso, supra note 79, at 63–68. “Among other things, the FCRA requires you to
establish and follow ‘reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the
information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.’” What Tenant
Background Screening Companies Need to Know About the Fair Credit Reporting Act, FED.
TRADE COMMISSION (Oct. 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/
what-tenant-background-screening-companies-need-know-about-fair
[https://perma.cc/
YJL8-HZ3E] (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2018)).
170. See Alex Hemani, Due Diligence: It Applies Equally to Properties and Prospective
Tenants, FORBES (Aug. 27, 2019, 8:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
forbesrealestatecouncil/2019/08/27/due-diligence-it-applies-equally-to-properties-andprospective-tenants/ [https://perma.cc/RD73-36LD].
171. See Collatz, supra note 166.
172. D’Urso, supra note 79, at 44 n.2.
173. Tenant Screening Services, supra note 166.
174. See Kaycee Miller, 10 Reasons Why My Rental Application Was Denied, RENTEC
DIRECT (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.rentecdirect.com/blog/rental-application-denied/
[https://perma.cc/P5ZR-N8FP].
175. See id.
176. Top 5 Reasons to Reject an Applicant, AM. APARTMENT OWNERS ASS’N,
https://www.american-apartment-owners-association.org/tenant-screening/top-5-reasons-toreject-an-applicant/ [https://perma.cc/TDZ8-3JRW] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
177. Dunn & Grabchuk, supra note 68, at 323.
178. Id. at 322.
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Landlords and other housing providers also use tenant screening
companies as an economical approach to limiting future liability.179 Since
landlords and housing providers invest significant time and money into
renting property, they can use screening services to protect their financial
investments.180 An all-inclusive search can cost up to sixty-nine dollars,
while a search of only court records costs around $6.95.181 Meanwhile, there
are substantial costs associated with regaining possession of leased premises
from an unruly tenant,182 and eviction can cost between $2500 and $3500.183
Filing an eviction requires a landlord to pay court costs, and a tenant may
also default on rental payments during this time, which can average more
than $500 a month in states like New York.184 If a court decides to proceed
with an eviction hearing and not give the tenant another opportunity to settle
things with the landlord, the landlord may have to hire a qualified attorney
and a marshal for a forceful eviction.185 If a landlord evicts a tenant for
destroying the housing unit, then the landlord is liable for refurbishing the
damaged apartment, which also prevents other tenants from occupying it in
the meantime.186
Advocates of tenant screening services believe these expenses can be
avoided by screening tenants.187 These savings can then be used to improve
tenants’ quality of living.188 If landlords offset the costs associated with
eviction by using screening services, they can invest that money into
improving their current tenants’ apartments or lowering rental costs.189
Tenants also benefit because screening companies can eliminate prospective
tenants who are likely to lower the quality of the living environment.190
Present occupants will not suffer from destructive cohabitants.191 They will
not endure as much damage or harassment, and their environment will be
preserved.192
Although landlords and housing providers accept that screening services
may have some shortcomings including reporting inaccurate data,193 they
argue that their free speech, property rights, and even personal safety could
179. D’Urso, supra note 79, at 51.
180. Becky Bower, Why Tenant Screening Is More Important Now Than Ever,
APPLYCONNECT (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.applyconnect.com/blog/tenant-screeningimportant-now-ever [https://perma.cc/N6V9-ATZX].
181. D’Urso, supra note 79, at 51.
182. Id. at 51–55.
183. Collatz, supra note 166.
184. D’Urso, supra note 79, at 51–52 & n.48.
185. Id. at 52–53.
186. Id. at 54.
187. Id. at 50–51; Hemani, supra note 170.
188. D’Urso, supra note 79, at 55–57.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 56–57.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Jeff Hamann, Screening with Tech: What You Need to Know, MULTI-HOUSING
NEWS (May 30, 2019), https://www.multihousingnews.com/post/screening-with-tech-whatyou-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/3TJC-7CV9].
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be jeopardized by legislation that attempts to restrict their access to
background reports.194 Pointing to the FCRA and state laws that ensure the
precision of background screening reports, one practitioner claims that the
screening service regime can be properly monitored through existing
legislation that already applies to their services.195 For example, the FCRA
contains provisions that prevent companies from reporting inaccurate
consumer data and information that infringes on a consumer’s privacy
interests.196 State legislation in California similarly limits tenant information
in reports to a specific time frame and contains provisions for fixing
inaccuracies.197
B. Imposing Liability on Tenant Screening Companies Under § 3604
This section discusses how critics of tenant screening background reports
believe the FHA should be interpreted. Part II.B.1 explores critics’ reliance
on CoreLogic198 to support a broad interpretation of § 3604 that covers
housing intermediaries. Part II.B.2 highlights critics’ policy arguments that
tenant screening services are harmful. Critics argue that screening creates
misleading, inaccurate, and discriminatory reports that harm racial and
gender minorities.
1. Extending the FHA’s “Otherwise Make Unavailable” Language:
District of Connecticut in CoreLogic
Critics believe that tenant screening companies should comply with and
face disparate impact liability under the FHA and interpret § 3604 broadly to
encompass intermediary liability beyond those who directly sell or rent
housing to tenants. CoreLogic illustrates this interpretation of § 3604, and
critics use it to argue for screening liability under the FHA.199
In 2016, Carmen Arroyo requested that WinnResidential, the manager of
her apartment complex, transfer her to a two-bedroom unit so that her son
could live with her.200 Arroyo consented to CoreLogic conducting a tenant

194. See Andrew Keshner, A New Seattle Housing Law Forbids Landlords from Checking
Tenants’ Criminal History—but Does It Go Too Far?, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 30, 2018, 2:59
PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/a-new-seattle-housing-law-forbids-landlordsfrom-checking-into-tenants-criminal-history-but-does-it-go-too-far-2018-12-26
[https://perma.cc/54K7-J25X].
195. D’Urso, supra note 79, at 63–68.
196. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018).
197. D’Urso, supra note 79, at 66.
198. Conn. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. CoreLogic Rental Prop. Sols., LLC, 369 F. Supp. 3d 362,
370–75 (D. Conn. 2019).
199. See Baskin, supra note 22; see also Madeline Byrd & Katherine J. Strandburg, CDA
230 for a Smart Internet, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 405, 418–19 (2019); Patrick Sisson, Housing
Discrimination Goes High Tech: How Algorithms, Ad Targeting, and Other New
Technologies Threaten Fair Housing Laws, CURBED (Dec. 17, 2019, 6:12 PM),
https://www.curbed.com/2019/12/17/21026311/mortgage-apartment-housing-algorithmdiscrimination [https://perma.cc/TA8M-2W34].
200. CoreLogic, 369 F. Supp. 3d at 367.
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screening check for her son.201 Defendant CoreLogic is a tenant screening
company that searches databases and sells reports to landlords.202
CoreLogic’s screening products include CrimSAFE, which provides housing
providers with a final decision on whether the applicant qualifies for their
housing unit.203 After CoreLogic screened Arroyo’s son using CrimSAFE,
it informed WinnResidential that he was disqualified from tenancy based on
unspecified criminal records.204 Arroyo’s son was not told at the time why
he was disqualified and could not move in.205 He had never been convicted
of a crime;206 he had once been charged with retail theft, but the charge was
eventually withdrawn.207
In CoreLogic, the court specifically focused on the CoreLogic’s liability
under the FHA.208 The plaintiffs claimed that CoreLogic violated the FHA
because it discriminated based on race when it denied housing to Arroyo’s
son based on his criminal record.209 CoreLogic moved to dismiss the FHA
claims on grounds that the FHA applies only to housing providers, not tenant
screening companies, and that its policies do not have a sufficient nexus to
the denial of housing to be covered.210 Judge Vanessa L. Bryant first
acknowledged that the language of the FHA is broad and must be carried out
“by a generous construction.”211 She highlighted HUD’s guidance, which
concluded that “a discriminatory effect resulting from a policy or practice
that denies housing to anyone with a prior arrest or any kind of criminal
conviction cannot be justified, and therefore such a practice would violate
the Fair Housing Act.”212 Since HUD’s guidance only applied to housing
providers, she used this interpretation as a guide to evaluate the FHA
claim.213
Judge Bryant rejected CoreLogic’s argument that it could not be liable
under the FHA because § 3604 only applies to “individuals who deal directly
with prospective buyers or tenants and are in control of the housing-related
decisions.”214 The court found that the absence of explicit language
providing for tenant screening company liability under the FHA was not

201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. “The report listed a ‘CrimSAFE result’ which stated that disqualifying records
were found. Based on these facts, the [c]ourt [found] that CrimSAFE disqualif[ied] applicants
for housing if the applicant was arrested but not convicted of a crime even though many years
had passed since the arrest.” Id. (citations omitted).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 367–68.
207. Id. at 368.
208. Id. at 370.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 372, 380.
211. Id. at 370; see also supra Parts I.A, I.C.
212. CoreLogic, 369 F. Supp. 3d at 371.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 372.
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determinative.215 The court drew support from the Second Circuit216 in
Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc.,217 which extended liability under the
FHA to landlords who knew and failed to stop tenant-on-tenant harassment,
explaining “that it has ‘never required every last detail of a legislative scheme
to be spelled out in a statute itself—especially a civil rights statute.’”218 In
Mitchell v. Shane,219 the Second Circuit found that a listing agent could be
liable under § 3604 even though he was not a housing provider.220 The
CoreLogic court concluded that entities other than housing providers could
be liable under the FHA.221
When CoreLogic pointed to Frederick, “claiming that the case rejected an
‘attempt to expand the reach of the FHA beyond those providing
housing,’”222 the court distinguished Frederick from the case at hand.223 The
Frederick court required that the challenged practice be related to real estate
transactions.224 Here, CoreLogic’s practice of screening potential tenants on
an impermissible basis and disqualifying them without further reasoning
caused the housing denial.225 Judge Bryant determined that CoreLogic’s
screening practices related to real estate transactions because they
determined who was qualified to live in a housing unit—specifically,
WinnResidential.226
In construing § 3604 to apply to housing intermediaries such as tenant
screening companies, the court reasoned that restricting the Act to housing
providers would allow providers to use intermediaries to make
discriminatory choices on their behalf, thereby contravening the purpose of
the FHA.227
2. Inaccurate, Misleading, and Discriminatory: The Growing Problems of
Screening Services
In addition to their preferred interpretation of the FHA, critics of tenant
screening services refer to a variety of policy reasons that demonstrate why
background screening reports are problematic. Chief among them is their

215. Id. at 374.
216. Id. at 373–75.
217. 944 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2019), reh’g granted 949 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2019). Similarly,
most federal courts construe the FHA broadly. See, e.g., Ga. State Conference of the NAACP
v. City of LaGrange, 940 F.3d 627, 632 (11th Cir. 2019) (refusing to read a temporal limitation
into the language of the FHA); Fahnbulleh v. GFZ Realty, LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 360, 364 (D.
Md. 2011) (holding a landlord liable under the FHA for tenant-on-tenant sexual harassment).
218. CoreLogic, 369 F. Supp. 3d at 374 (quoting Francis, 944 F.3d at 378).
219. 350 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2003).
220. Id. at 49–50.
221. CoreLogic, 369 F. Supp. 3d at 373–75.
222. Id. at 372–73 (quoting CoreLogic’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 25, at 9).
223. Id. at 373.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 375.
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inaccurate, misleading, and discriminatory nature.228 Background screening
reports often include numerous errors229 and bar minorities from housing,230
including those whose past criminal and eviction histories do not reflect their
ability to be good future tenants.231 The algorithms that these background
reports use may not be based on explicit minority status, but critics believe
the data that screening companies seek is inherently biased.232
Critics highlight tenant reports’ two main “information-related problems:
errors (mismatching) and omitted or misleading information.”233 Since
verifying tenant information is more expensive than collecting it, tenant
screening companies might not check if the information they collect is
accurate.234 Mismatching is common because screening companies
primarily use a tenant’s name when searching databases.235 This can result
in a “false positive,” where a screener may report a criminal record that
belongs to “a different person of the same or similar name.”236 A false
positive can be especially common when the screener fails to notice available
data indicating differences between the two names, such as date of birth or a
middle name.237 Human error exacerbates these inaccuracies. In 2013, the
Harvard Legal Aid Bureau revealed that MassCourts, a court electronic case
system, incorrectly displayed eviction judgments against tenants, who had
none, in 10 percent of cases.238 Screening companies that receive bulk data
from databases and do not update it239 mistakenly include expunged records
and omit final dispositions.240 Reports can list tenants’ evictions or criminal
228. Ehman, supra note 4, at 3–5; see also Valerie Schneider, Racism Knocking at the
Door: The Use of Criminal Background Checks in Rental Housing, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 923,
939 (2019); Stauffer, supra note 77, at 259–65.
229. Rudy Kleysteuber, Note, Tenant Screening Thirty Years Later: A Statutory Proposal
to Protect Public Records, 116 YALE L.J. 1344, 1358–61 (2007).
230. See Ehman, supra note 4, at 3–5.
231. Stauffer, supra note 77, at 261 (“The mere fact that tenants’ names appear in a court
proceeding does not mean that they were at fault or are poor rental risks, and yet their names
will appear in the screening service’s files, giving landlords the impression that these tenants
have broken the law.”).
232. See id.
233. Kleysteuber, supra note 229, at 1358.
234. Stauffer, supra note 77, at 244.
235. Kleysteuber, supra note 229, at 1358.
236. CMTY. LEGAL SERVS., INC. ET AL., supra note 93, at 7.
237. Id. (“In another ‘mismatch’ case, the commercial background screener searched the
database of the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts for a client with a common
name. It reported 18 different criminal cases against our client—none of which was his. The
screener failed to examine the year of birth connected with each case; almost none of the
defendants were even born in the same decade as our client! This case illustrates why searches
by name only should never be permitted.”).
238. Esme Caramello & Annette Duke, The Misuse of MassCourts as a Free Tenant
Screening Device, BOS. B.J., Fall 2015, at 15, 16.
239. See YU & DIETRICH, supra note 95, at 21 (“Bulk data dissemination is the practice in
which public sources, often the courts, sell their data on a wholesale basis to the consumer
reporting agencies. The problem arises when background screening agencies fail to update
these records properly.”).
240. Id. at 21–26. Sometimes background check companies report that charges were filed
against tenants but do not report if they were convicted (i.e., the case’s final disposition). Id.
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disputes without stating whether they were actually evicted or convicted,
prevailed in court, or settled with their landlord.241 Even a tenant’s lawsuit
against a former negligent landlord may appear in their report, making future
landlords think that the tenant violated the law.242
Critics of screening services also highlight that background screening
reports have a disparate impact on racial minorities.243 “Because racial bias
exists within both the criminal justice system and the housing market,
minorities find it especially difficult to secure housing after an arrest or
conviction.”244 African Americans are arrested at rates 2.5 times higher than
whites.245 Even though African Americans and Hispanics combined make
up around 28 percent of the U.S. population, almost 60 percent of the
sentenced prison population is African American or Hispanic.246 In 2017,
there were 1549 African American prisoners for every 100,000 African
American adults and 823 Hispanic prisoners for every 100,000 Hispanic
adults, compared to 272 white prisoners for every 100,000 white adults.247
This inequality also exists along gender lines; the imprisonment rate of
African American women (260 per 100,000) is more than twice that of white
women (91 per 100,000).248
Scholars show that the several million American families facing eviction
every year follow similar racial and gender trends.249 Women and people of
color are evicted at higher rates and are disproportionately impacted by
eviction history reports.250 In 2012, New York City courts experienced about
eighty evictions per day for tenants’ failure to pay rent.251 According to
scholar Matthew Desmond, Hispanic renters living in predominantly white
neighborhoods are twice as likely to be evicted for missing rent than other
at 24. People may appear to have pending charges against them when in fact those charges
have been dropped or reduced. Id.
241. Kleysteuber, supra note 229, at 1360.
242. Stauffer, supra note 77, at 261.
243. Schneider, supra note 228, at 925–27.
244. Id. at 936–38.
245. Id. at 926.
246. Gramlich, supra note 2.
247. This means that African Americans were imprisoned at a rate nearly six times higher
than their white counterparts. Id. Similarly, in 2013, 4347 per every 100,000 African men and
1755 per every 100,000 Hispanic men were incarcerated, compared to 678 per every 100,000
white men. Rebecca J. Walter et al., One Strike to Second Chances: Using Criminal
Backgrounds in Admission Decisions for Assisted Housing 1–2 (Sept. 6, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316448453_One_Strike_to_Second_
Chances_Using_Criminal_Backgrounds_in_Admission_Decisions_for_Assisted_Housing
[https://perma.cc/7LVU-ULNV].
248. Walter et al., supra note 247 (manuscript at 2).
249. Les Christie, Rents Are Soaring—and so Are Evictions, CNN MONEY (Oct. 29, 2014,
7:12 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2014/10/29/real_estate/evicted/ [https://perma.cc/FP5CGXEC]; see also Emily Badger & Quoctrung Bui, In 83 Million Eviction Records, a Sweeping
and Intimate New Look at Housing in America, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/07/upshot/millions-of-eviction-records-a-sweepingnew-look-at-housing-in-america.html [https://perma.cc/Y57W-QWQN].
250. Ehman, supra note 4, at 5.
251. Deena Greenberg et al., Discrimination in Evictions: Empirical Evidence and Legal
Challenges, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 115, 117 (2016).
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“habitual, late-rent payers.”252 Likewise, low-income African American253
and Hispanic women are evicted at higher rates than men, and single mothers
face a very high risk of eviction as well.254 African American women
specifically face greater rates of eviction because of low wages and gender
dynamics.255 One study illustrates that single mothers face more evictions
because landlords are more likely to evict families with children.256 The use
of evictions among landlords has created an “‘[e]viction [e]conomy’ . . . in
which eviction of the poor is not exceptional, but rather the norm, part of
landlords’ business models and poor people’s way of life.”257
Some may believe that landlords have the ultimate power to decide
whether to deny housing. In reality, tenant screening companies create
inaccurate, misleading, and discriminatory reports that determine a
landlord’s tenant selection.258 Scholar Eric Dunn argues: “The companies
that offer these tools frame them as recommendations for landlords, which
they can override. . . . If the machine calculates a failing decision, . . . there’s
little other basis for a landlord to come to a different conclusion, especially
if the landlord isn’t provided the complete history.”259
III. INTERPRETING § 3604 TO COMBAT THE DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT OF
TENANT SCREENING COMPANIES
In light of the two diverging views articulated in Part II, this Part argues
that state and federal courts should hold tenant screening companies liable
under both § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) of the FHA. Specifically, this Part
suggests that courts should follow the interpretation of § 3604 put forth by
the Seventh Circuit in NAACP. Tenant screening companies are inherently
similar to insurance companies, and their policies and practices should
likewise be covered by § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) of the FHA. The spirit of
NAACP, coupled with the Supreme Court’s view that the FHA is to be
construed broadly,260 demands that courts interpret the FHA to combat
screening companies’ disparate impact. Of the two camps discussed in Part
II, CoreLogic is most in line with the Seventh Circuit in NAACP.
252. Id. at 144.
253. “[W]omen from black neighborhoods in Milwaukee represented only 9.6 percent of
the population, but [they accounted for] 30 percent of the evictions.” DESMOND, supra note 1,
at 1.
254. Matthew Desmond & Monica Bell, Housing, Poverty, and the Law, 11 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 15, 25 (2015).
255. See DESMOND, supra note 1, at 1. “This study, based on an in-depth look at evictions
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, finds that women’s nonconfrontational approach with landlords and
their tendency to dodge the issue are two reasons why women from black neighborhoods in
Milwaukee represented only 9.6 percent of the population, but 30 percent of the evictions.”
Id.
256. Id. at 1–2.
257. David A. Dana, An Invisible Crisis in Plain Sight: The Emergence of the “Eviction
Economy,” Its Causes, and the Possibilities for Reform in Legal Regulation and Education,
115 MICH. L. REV. 935, 935 (2017).
258. Lecher, supra note 8.
259. Id. Eric Dunn is the litigation director of the National Housing Law Project. Id.
260. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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Part III.A urges courts to follow the interpretation articulated in NAACP,
which held that intermediaries should be liable under the FHA.261 Part III.B
discusses the policy reasons that necessitate making the FHA applicable to
tenant screening companies. Part III.B also reaffirms the discriminatory
nature of background screening reports and discusses how the FHA’s text
and congressional intent support a broad reading. Each section addresses and
attempts to assuage the opposing sides’ concerns.
A. Following NAACP: Interpreting § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) to Cover
Tenant Screening Companies’ Disparate Impact
Currently, two district court opinions support each respective side’s notion
of tenant screening liability. Those who believe screening reports are a vital
part of the industry point to Frederick’s interpretation of § 3604 and propose
that the FHA should only apply to those who participate in the “sale or rental”
of housing, i.e., direct housing providers.262 In contrast, those who criticize
background screening reports point to CoreLogic to argue that tenant
screening companies should be held liable under § 3604.263 Moving forward,
courts should not only hold screening companies liable under the FHA but
also utilize the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation in NAACP to do so.
Of the two positions presented in Part II, CoreLogic’s interpretation is
more in line with NAACP. Even so, courts should rely more heavily on
NAACP’s interpretation of § 3604. While the District of Connecticut does
argue for a generous and broad reading of the FHA, the Seventh Circuit’s
opinion in NAACP truly encompasses the need for intermediary liability and,
as follows, tenant screening liability under both § 3604(a) and § 3604(b).
The Seventh Circuit articulates an interpretation of the FHA that federal
courts and administrative law have both come to support.264 As such, it is
helpful to turn to NAACP for an interpretation that will support screening
company liability.
In NAACP, the Seventh Circuit focuses on two aspects of the FHA when
discussing property insurance liability: § 3604(a) and § 3604(b).265 First,
the Seventh Circuit reads “[to] otherwise make unavailable” in § 3604(a)
expansively and concludes that the denial of property insurance can
indirectly lead to the denial of housing.266 The role that insurance companies
play in the housing arena is analogous to the role that tenant screening
companies play. When a tenant screening company creates a background
screening report, it provides information on a prospective tenant and a score
that indirectly determines if housing will be made available to that tenant.
Just as denial of insurance likely leads to denial of a prospective tenant’s

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.C.
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application, a screening report with criminal or eviction history also likely
leads to denial of a housing application.
Second, under § 3604(b), the Seventh Circuit concludes that property
insurance is a “service” provided in connection with the “sale or rental of a
dwelling.”267 In the world of commerce divided between “goods” and
“services,” tenant screening is also a “service.” Landlords employ tenant
screening companies to learn and synthesize information about prospective
tenants and provide a complete picture of the applicant.268 As the Seventh
Circuit concluded, “in connection” may be read broadly to carry out the goal
of removing obstacles to minorities’ ownership of housing.269 A generous
reading of § 3604(b) that includes tenant screening company liability is
equally beneficial in removing the many obstacles that background screening
reports present for racial and gender minorities.
Proponents of tenant screening services may have issues with this
interpretation because much of the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in NAACP
relies on HUD’s position that § 3604 includes property insurance liability.270
While HUD has never explicitly acknowledged tenant screening liability
under the FHA, it has highlighted that the Act is broad and covers housing
intermediaries.271 As the court in NAACP and the Supreme Court have
suggested, courts should give deference to this view.272 As such, the
proponents’ argument that the FHA is limited to direct housing providers is
inherently flawed. Similarly, their reliance on Frederick contradicts federal
precedent and HUD’s perspective of the FHA. By emphasizing a “sale or
rental” requirement in § 3604,273 Frederick risks narrowing the scope of the
FHA to housing providers and contravenes the FHA’s purpose.
Alternatively, proponents may argue that utilizing the NAACP
interpretation exposes tenant screening companies to too much liability. To
appease these concerns, courts could provide more flexibility under HUD’s
disparate impact theory for tenant screening companies that comply with the
FCRA and do not provide final guidance to landlords. Most screening
companies create background reports with a final score or
recommendation.274 They take it upon themselves to determine who is
suitable to live in a housing unit, and landlords normally abide by this
guidance.275 For instance, the CoreLogic court took issue with the fact that
267. See supra Part I.C.
268. See supra Part I.B.
269. See supra Part I.C.
270. See supra Part I.C.
271. See supra Part I.C.
272. NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 300 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[I]ndeed
long before the [HUD] Secretary had the power to issue regulations and adjudicate complaints
under Title VIII, the Supreme Court declared that the [HUD] Secretary’s views about the
meaning of that statute are entitled to ‘great weight’.”); see also Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972) (“We are told that this is the consistent administrative
construction of the Act. Such construction is entitled to great weight.”).
273. See supra Part II.A.1.
274. See supra Part II.B.2.
275. See supra Part II.B.2.
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the defendant’s background report recommended that the landlord deny
housing.276 If screening companies eliminate this component from their
reports and fully comply with the FCRA’s accuracy requirements, then
courts could give leeway when determining if a screening company truly
made housing unavailable under § 3604(a) or furnished a service that was in
connection to the sale or rental of a dwelling under § 3604(b). Specifically,
future courts could consider the precautions taken by tenant screening
companies when determining if plaintiffs have met their burden of
establishing a prima facie case under HUD’s disparate impact framework.277
B. Necessity, Text, and Precedent Support Tenant Screening Liability
Under § 3604 of the FHA
Tenant screening companies have a negative effect on the lives of racial
and gender minorities.278 These screening companies have a lot of power
because housing providers often rely on their background reports. Landlords
may seem to control the ultimate housing decision, but in a world where
landlords receive thousands of applications, they typically follow any
recommendation that a tenant screening company provides.279
This score or recommendation is usually determined by an algorithm that
does not consider the unique circumstances of a prospective tenant’s credit,
criminal, or eviction history.280 Because criminal convictions and evictions
do not equally impact all populations within this country, these algorithms
tend to disproportionately affect minorities.281 To combat this impact, it is
necessary to create a strong foundation for holding tenant screening
companies liable under the FHA, specifically § 3604.
Although tenant screening companies must comply with the regulations
set forth in the FCRA,282 they should also face liability under the FHA’s
disparate impact theory. The FCRA attempts to limit the number of
inaccuracies that are contained in background screening reports, but nothing
in the statute targets the discriminatory impact of these reports.283 While the
FCRA creates a space for liability when screening companies include
misleading or inaccurate information, it does not allow an aggrieved minority
plaintiff to seek relief for the disparate impact created by tenant screening
background reports.284
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Congress created the FHA to ensure a housing market free of
discrimination, and it is one of the strongest federal laws available to support
equal access to housing.285 Taken together, the FCRA and the FHA can be
used to prevent discrimination while also targeting the inaccurate and
misleading information that screening companies present in background
screening reports.
Holding tenant screening companies liable under the FHA is consistent
with congressional intent and the language of § 3604. When writing the Act,
Congress created significant ambiguity and left it to courts to decide which
actors the Act should apply to.286 Section 3604 and other sections of the
FHA only clarify which types of practices, not actors, the FHA covers.287
Congress wrote the Act in the passive voice and banned certain outcomes:
“to refuse,” “to discriminate,” and “to make print or publish.”288 The Act
does not say who the actor is or how they bring about such an outcome.289
Congress has remained silent as courts have taken the lead in defining the
Act’s boundaries. Courts, such as the Seventh Circuit, have utilized this grant
of power to hold insurance companies liable under the Act.290 It is time that
courts also interpret § 3604 of the FHA to hold tenant screening companies
liable for their discriminatory background screening reports.
Additionally, judicial precedent and administrative guidance support a
broad reading of the FHA that covers tenant screening companies. In
Inclusive Communities, the Supreme Court affirmed the existence of the
disparate impact theory to bar practices that have a disproportionate impact
on protected categories.291 The Court also acknowledged the broad nature
of the FHA.292 Other federal courts have similarly read the Act’s language
expansively.293 For example, in CoreLogic, the District of Connecticut
highlighted that the absence of language in the FHA implicating intermediary
liability is not determinative.294 In 2019, the Eleventh Circuit held that utility
providers who discriminate after an individual has acquired a housing unit
can also be held liable under the FHA’s § 3604(b) because “[t]he [FHA]
statute does not contain any language limiting its application to
discriminatory conduct that occurs prior to or at the moment of the sale or
rental.”295 These decisions all extend the Act to actions taken by housing
intermediaries. Construing the FHA to cover tenant screening companies is
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in accordance with state and federal courts’ broad and generous constructions
of the Act.296
Furthermore, HUD, an administrative agency that has been given
significant deference by both Congress and the Supreme Court in construing
the FHA, has limited the harm that past criminal convictions and records can
have on tenants.297 In 2016, HUD released guidance that acknowledged the
disparate impact that criminal background checks have on prospective
tenants and held that “a discriminatory effect resulting from a policy or
practice that denies housing to anyone with a prior arrest or any kind of
criminal conviction cannot be justified, and therefore such a practice would
violate the Fair Housing Act.”298 Although the guidance spoke only to
landlords, and not tenant screening companies, who utilize criminal history
data,299 expanding the FHA to cover tenant screening liability falls in line
with HUD’s interpretation of the Act. Tenant screening companies include
criminal history in their reports and usually include a final disposition based
on such records.300 HUD’s concern with the disparate impact of criminal
arrest records can be best addressed by reading the Act generously and
expansively.
Tenant screening companies have a disparate impact on minority
populations.301 Racial and gender minorities—two protected classes under
the FHA—are more likely to experience criminal convictions and evictions
than their white and male counterparts.302 This disproportionate impact is
not just limited across racial or gender lines; it is an intersectional problem
that significantly targets African American and Hispanic women as well.303
One way to equalize the housing economy and ensure minorities’ access to
housing is to have the FHA apply to the practices of both direct housing
providers and housing intermediaries, namely tenant screening companies.
As explained in Part II.A, landlords rely on screening services to conduct
comprehensive checks on prospective tenants and provide safe environments
for their current tenants.304 Housing providers will likely push back on
adopting a broad interpretation of the FHA because it limits their ability to
access cost-effective screening resources. However, adopting screening
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liability under the FHA will not limit landlords’ abilities to prevent future
tenant liabilities in their units.
Expanding the FHA to explicitly cover screening companies would not
prevent landlords from using screening reports and screening tenants;
however, the FHA, like the FCRA, would place limitations on what
information can be included. To ensure compliance with the FHA, tenant
screening companies would not be able to use search criteria that are
“proxies” for race and gender, such as criminal history and eviction data.305
Not only does this information disproportionately impact certain populations
but it is often not useful criteria or data.306 Tenant screening companies could
still include information on credit scores, employment history, and other data
that does not have a disparate impact on protected categories under the FHA.
Moreover, as discussed in Part II.B.2, criminal and eviction histories are
typically outdated and inaccurate and do not paint a full picture of a
prospective tenant.307 Often, the background screening report presents
information that is twenty to thirty years old or a conviction that a court
ultimately dismissed because the charge against the tenant was unfounded.308
Eliminating the use of criteria that has a disparate impact will allow for more
accurate screening reports to limit tenant liability. If screening companies
create accurate reports that do not have a disparate impact, critics will likely
trust them and the services they provide. Even landlords are hesitant to
potentially violate the FCRA or FHA.309 If a background screening report is
accurate and nondiscriminatory, housing providers will not have to worry as
much about an aggrieved tenant pursuing an FHA-based case against them.
CONCLUSION
Landlords and other housing providers increasingly use tenant screening
companies to gain information on prospective tenants. This reliance usually
leads to the disproportionate exclusion of racial and gender minorities from
housing. Specifically, tenant screening companies create background reports
that have a disparate impact on protected categories under the FHA. By
including criminal and eviction histories in their reports, tenant screening
companies disproportionately target those minorities who most often face
prison time or displacement from their homes. To combat this disparate
impact, it is imperative that tenant screening companies face liability for their
actions under the FHA—specifically under the Act’s disparate impact theory.
Courts can best achieve this result by construing § 3604 of the FHA broadly
so that the section extends past housing providers to housing intermediaries.
The Seventh Circuit in NAACP and other federal courts, such as the District
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of Connecticut in CoreLogic, provide a reliable interpretation for courts to
follow. When it comes time for other state and federal courts to determine if
tenant screening liability exists under the FHA, they should follow the
generous construction of § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) articulated in judicial
precedent, the FHA’s legislative history, and HUD’s administrative
guidance.

